CA2ON
NRC800
-1989
N057

Government
Publications

ACCOUNTABILITY and REPRESENTATION

by
Brian Koscak
and
David Siegel

Niagara Region Review Commission

Presented to the

LIBRARY *of the*

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

by

J. STEFAN DUPRE

NIAGARA REGION REVIEW COMMISSION

BACKGROUND STUDY

ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION

by

Brian Koscak and David Siegel

September 1988

This background study has been prepared for the Niagara Region Review Commission to assist it in its deliberations. All recommendations, conclusions or comments in this study are strictly those of the authors of the study and do not reflect the views of the Commission.

A publication of the:

Niagara Region Review Commission
4572 Queen Street
Niagara Falls, Ontario L2E 2L6
1-800-263-8800
416-354-5601

Harry Kitchen,
Chairman

David Siegel,
Research Director

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding from
University of Toronto

https://archive.org/details/31761115471823

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

Regional Government: The Canadian Experience 2

- Ontario 2
- Quebec 20
- British Columbia 33

Some Alternatives for the Region of Niagara 38

- The Election of Regional Councillors 38
- The Office of the Regional Chairperson: Issues and Concerns 54

Appendix: Survey of Regional Councillors 65

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Some of the most contentious issues concerning Regional Government in Niagara have revolved around the method of selection of Regional Councillors and the Regional Chairperson. The purpose of this background study is to provide information on the way in which these issues are handled in other jurisdictions, both in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada, and to set out certain alternatives which could be employed in Niagara.

The purpose of listing these alternatives is to stimulate informed discussion of these topics which will help to guide the Commission in producing its final recommendations. Thus, the idea is to encourage debate, not limit it. The alternatives listed here are the main ones currently under consideration by the Commission because they are the ones which have been proposed. If any other viable proposals are put forward, the Commission will certainly consider those in making its final recommendations.

There is also an appendix to this report containing the summary results of a questionnaire completed by Regional Councillors in July 1988. This questionnaire sought Councillors' opinions on a wide variety of issues relating to Regional Government.

REGIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

The first section of the report provides considerable detail on the electoral systems of regional governments in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia to determine what lessons there might be in other jurisdictions for Niagara. There were two main innovations found in these jurisdictions.

Weighted voting systems are employed quite widely in Quebec, British Columbia, and in the county system in Ontario. This is a system which gives each elected representative a number of votes which reflects the number of constituents he or she represents. This system has a number of advantages.

Federations whose constituent parts vary quite widely in size have a serious problem in establishing systems of representation. If the smallest unit is entitled to one representative and all other units receive a proportional share, the size of the legislative body can become very large. However, weighted voting gets around

this by allowing politicians who represent larger numbers of people to have proportionally more votes.

Voting rules to protect particular interests. There is sometimes an assumption that majority rule is the only acceptable dictum in a democracy. On the contrary, to protect some special interest, special voting rules might need to be invoked. For example, in the Communauté urbaine de Québec, a motion must receive a simple majority which includes the support of representatives of five municipalities. This ensures that the largest city cannot totally dominate the council.

One should not assume that majority rule is the only appropriate rule; more innovative formulas can be devised to serve particular purposes.

THE ELECTION OF REGIONAL COUNCILLORS

The second section of the report suggests alternative electoral structures for Niagara. The first issue discussed is the method of apportionment of seats among area municipalities. The ideal apportionment formula balances four concerns:

-strict representation by population

-protection of minority interests

-an optimum size of council

-an electoral system which is readily understandable to the average citizen

The conflict inherent in these four criteria must be weighed carefully. On the one hand, a council which adhered closely to the principle of representation by population would tend to be quite large and unwieldy, and might not allow for the protection of minority interests. On the other hand, excessive safeguards for minority interests might require significant deviation from representation by population and could allow the minority to thwart the desires of the majority.

A number of different electoral arrangements were considered and each was evaluated using the four criteria mentioned above.

The **status quo** is obviously one option (table 21, p. 40). This system generates a fairly high level of

over/under representation, but this is almost inevitable in a region containing municipalities with a diversity of population.

The major criticisms of the existing structure have come from the large municipalities which are under-represented and from some of the smaller municipalities which feel they should have more than one seat on council. In fact, some people have argued that all municipalities should have at least two representatives because this is the only way to ensure proper representation on the main committees of regional government where so much of council's work is done.

One change which could be made in the status quo or in a number of the other systems to be discussed below would be the use of a ward system to select regional councillors in cities with a large number of elected councillors.

A system which provided **equal representation** (table 22, p. 43) to all area municipalities was also considered. This system has the virtues of being easy to understand and possibly reducing the size of council, but it also has the highest level of over/under-representation of any formula considered.

The Wainfleet formula (table 23, p. 44) provides for exactly proportional representation. This formula takes the population of Wainfleet, 5,983, and allocates seats to other municipalities on the basis of one for each 5,983 residents.

Not surprisingly, this formula generates the lowest level of over/under-representation. A disadvantage of this system is that it is quite weak in the protection of minority interests. The two largest municipalities could conceivably control any vote of council. However, the major weakness of this scheme is the large size of council that would be generated.

The Wainfleet ÷ 2 Formula (table 24, p. 45) takes the number of representatives generated by the Wainfleet formula and divides that result by two for each municipality except Wainfleet.

This formula has a number of attractive features. It produces a council only slightly larger than the existing one and its level of over/under-representation is only slightly higher than that of the Wainfleet formula.

On the negative side, under this formula seven of the twelve area municipalities have only one representative. Like the Wainfleet formula, this formula also means that the two largest municipalities have a majority of councillors.

Using **the 20/20 formula** (table 25, p. 47), each municipality would be entitled to two representatives for its first 20,000 residents (or any part thereof) and one additional representative for each additional 20,000 residents (or any part thereof).

The 20/20 formula provides each municipality with at least two representatives. It tempers the strict "rep-by-pop" idea by favouring the smaller municipalities. In this system, councillors from at least four municipalities must support a proposal before it can be accepted.

On the negative side, this system creates a somewhat larger council than the present one. This system also produces a level of over/under-representation significantly larger than the previous formulas, although it is only slightly larger than the status quo.

A system employing **regional wards** would ignore the existing municipal boundaries and divide the region into wards solely for the purposes of the regional election.

This system has the advantage of providing maximum flexibility. The optimum number of councillors could be determined and the appropriate number of wards established. Problems of under or over-representation would disappear if boundaries were drawn carefully.

The disadvantages of this system are that imposing a new set of ward boundaries which have nothing in common with the existing ones might be confusing to voters, and there is no assurance that there will always be a representative from each municipality.

A variation on the above system would be **regional wards plus the mayors.** In this system the mayors of the area municipalities automatically serve on Regional Council with additional members being elected from regional wards.

This would have the advantage of retaining the mayors as members of Regional Council and it would tend to reduce the parochialism of the other councillors. It would also ensure that each municipality would have at least one representative on Regional Council.

It would have the same disadvantage of the previous model of introducing a new set of ward boundaries which might be confusing to voters.

As a part of any of the preceding models, a system of **weighting voting** could be introduced. This system assigns a weight to the vote of each representative depending on the number of voters he or she represents. This system is employed in regional governments in Quebec and British Columbia, and in counties in Ontario. It has never been employed in regional governments in Ontario. Any system which is used so widely is certainly worthy of consideration.

Its main advantage is that it could provide a relatively small council which would still reflect population patterns in voting.

A potential disadvantage of this system is that it could allow the larger municipalities to totally dominate the system. Of course, the weighting does not have to be exactly proportional. The weighting could be set to reflect only partially the full population strength of the larger areas.

Innovative voting systems could also be introduced to ensure that a small number of large municipalities could not dominate the system to the detriment of the smaller ones. The smaller municipalities could be given greater influence by such voting rules as requiring that a motion must have:

-a simple majority of votes, but those voting must represent some minimum number of municipalities, or

-a double majority--a majority of councillors representing large municipalities and a majority representing smaller municipalities.

These systems hold a real attraction in terms of protecting the rights of minorities, but they must be constructed very carefully or they could be a prescription for a stalemate and the thwarting of the majority will by a well-organized minority.

Given the inherent conflict between some criteria, it is not surprising that none of the systems discussed stands out as satisfying all four criteria. Usually, what is gained as measured by one criterion is lost on another. The best solution will be the one which most successfully balances all four criteria.

The report also deals with the controversial issue of whether mayors should continue to serve ex officio as Regional Councillors. It concludes that on balance, it would seem that not allowing mayors to serve on Regional Council deprives Council of experienced and senior members who could play a valuable role in maintaining communications between the two tiers. For this reason, mayors should continue to be ex officio members of Regional Council.

THE OFFICE OF REGIONAL CHAIRPERSON: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

The report assesses the advantages and disadvantages of different methods of selecting the Regional Chairperson.

Selection by Regional Councillors

Currently, the Chairperson is selected by vote of Regional Councillors at the inaugural meeting of each new council. The main advantage of this system is that it ensures that the Chairperson will have the confidence and support of the majority of councillors at the time of the election.

Two arguments are sometimes made about the "alleged" undemocratic nature of the current procedure. First, non-elected persons are eligible to be elected as Regional Chairperson. Second, the Regional Chairperson is not directly accountable to the general population of the Region when he or she is elected by a constituency of only twenty-nine people.

Selection of Chairperson Three Months Before the Municipal Election

This system still involves selection of the Regional Chairperson by regional councillors. However, it requires a council, close to the end of its term, to select the Chairperson for the next Regional Council.

This system is similar to the previous system and has many of the same strengths and weaknesses. However, it does have certain advantages over the previous system.

Currently, voting on the selection of a Chairperson is the first decision taken by a new councillor. Under this revised system, the decision would be made by experienced councillors who have worked with most, if

not all, of the front-running candidates for at least three years.

The main disadvantage of this system is that the Chairperson of a council is chosen by the previous council.

Election by the General Public

There is some support for the election of the Regional Chairperson by a Region-wide election.

A Chairperson, directly elected by all qualified voters, is directly accountable to the citizens of the Region. The Chairperson would have a popular mandate giving the office greater political influence and credibility.

However, direct election raises a number of concerns. Candidates running for the office of Regional Chairperson in Niagara must cover a huge area with a population of approximately 370,000 people. The cost of mounting a campaign in this area would be enormous. The size of the constituency and the fragmented nature of the media in the Niagara area put candidates from the smaller municipalities at a decided disadvantage.

In short, while the idea of electing a Chairperson by a region-wide popular ballot is an attractive idea, there are some particularities of the Niagara area which must be seriously considered before reaching a final decision.

Must the Chairperson Be a Member of Regional Council?

Currently, the Regional Council can select anyone to be Regional Chairperson. The person does not have to be a regional councillor or even a resident of the Region.

The option of requiring that the Regional Chairperson must be chosen from the ranks of regional council should be considered seriously. While this system does not go as far as direct election, it would ensure that the Chairperson was accountable to some constituency.

Should the Chairperson Have to Resign His or Her Seat?

The main argument for requiring a councillor elected Regional Chairperson to resign his or her seat is that a

conflict of interest could exist between the person's role as the head of Regional Council and his or her role as a Councillor elected to look after the interests of a particular jurisdiction.

On balance, it seems that serious consideration ought to be given to allowing a Chairperson to retain his or her seat on Council.

Should Mayors be Eligible for Election as Chairperson?

Currently, the mayors of the area municipalities have the same right as anyone else to stand for election for Regional Chairperson. It was argued above that a person could serve as both Regional Chairperson and councillor from a particular municipality without being in a serious conflict of interest situation.

However, serving as both Regional Chairperson and mayor is not a similar situation. A mayor is head of an area municipal council, and comes to Regional Council as the sole spokesperson for that municipality's council. Serving as the head of two councils is an impossible situation.

If the Commission recommends that the Regional Chairperson should <u>not</u> be required to resign his or her seat, then a logical point which flows from this is that a mayor cannot also serve as the Regional Chairperson.

Ensuring That Provisions <u>Fit</u> Together Properly Is Important

A complication in choosing from the alternatives outlined above is that it is not simply a matter of choosing the best solution in each isolated case. Some solutions fit together better than others. This means that addressing the issues above is not simply a matter of choosing the desired solution in each isolated case. Rather, one must choose the best **mix** of alternatives, even if this entails selecting one element of a solution which is second-best, only because it fits with another item which is highly desirable.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Some of the most contentious issues concerning Regional Government in Niagara have revolved around the method of selection of Regional Councillors and the Regional Chairperson. The purpose of this background study is to provide information on the way in which these issues are handled in other jurisdictions, both in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada, and to set out certain alternatives which could be employed in Niagara.

The purpose of listing these alternatives is to stimulate informed discussion of these topics which will help to guide the Commission in producing its final recommendations. Thus, the idea is to encourage debate, not limit it. The alternatives listed here are the main ones currently under consideration by the Commission because they are the ones which have been proposed. If any other viable proposals are put forward, the Commission will certainly consider those in making its final recommendations.

There is also an appendix to this report containing the summary results of a questionnaire completed by Regional Councillors in July 1988. This questionnaire sought Councillors' opinions on a wide variety of issues relating to Regional Government. These results will be discussed at various places in the body of this report, but it is quite enlightening to examine them and compare the findings to a similar questionnaire administered in 1976 by the Archer Commission.

REGIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

O N T A R I O

This section outlines the system of regional government in Ontario and provides details on some of the other two tier governments in the province. A significant amount of detail is provided for Niagara and for some other regions and counties. This comparative information provides interesting examples of innovative structures or processes. Information is also provided about the structures of all regional governments in Ontario along with some commentary about recent changes and major issues.

Since there is a wide diversity in the method of selection of councillors in different regional governments, some definition of terms is required in discussing these different methods.

The earliest model employed in Metro Toronto and in all regional governments other than Niagara was indirect election of councillors. In this model, councillors served on regional council by virtue of their election to some office in an area municipality, for example, mayor, member of Board of Control, or top vote-getter in a multi-member ward. In Niagara, the mayors of the twelve area municipalities are indirectly elected to Regional Council.

Niagara was the first Region in which direct election was employed for the election of some Regional Councillors. Seventeen of the twenty-nine Regional Councillors are elected directly to serve on Regional Council and only on Regional Council.

A third arrangement is referred to as the joint-seat or double-direct system. In this system, candidates stand for election to a particular seat which is identified as serving on the councils of both the area municipality and the regional government. This varies from the traditional indirect election system in that candidates must specify their desires to serve on regional council before the election; they do not become regional councillors as a by-product of the result of another election. Thus, voters know in advance which candidates are standing for election to both councils and which candidates are standing for election to the area municipal council only.

The advantages of indirect election are:

Councillors serving on both tiers are able to act as links between the two tiers and so facilitate communication and cooperation between them.

Councillors who serve on both tiers can ensure that the interests of their area municipalities are strongly represented at the Region. Concerns of area municipalities will have to be taken into account in making Regional decisions.

The advantages of direct election are:

Serving on both councils (and their committees) imposes a significant time commitment on those elected. A person serving on only one council will be better able to devote more time to his or her responsibilities. When people serve on both councils, it is frequently the role of regional councillor which must suffer, because aldermen are elected first and foremost to deal with local issues.

Councillors are likely to be less parochial and think more in region-wide terms because they are not also members of an area municipal council.

Serving on only one council also eliminates any possibility of a conflict of interest between the two duties.

The advantages of the joint-seat system are:

It retains the benefits of having a linkage between the two tiers, but ensures that those elected will see their prime responsibility to the regional government.

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF NIAGARA

The Regional Municipality of Niagara was established on January 1, 1970. At that time, the twenty-six municipalities in Lincoln and Welland counties were consolidated into twelve municipalities. Table 1 sets out the current electoral system for Niagara. The only difference between the current system and the one established in 1970 is that St. Catharines now has one more seat than it originally had.

Regional Niagara was unique when it was established in that some members of Regional Council were directly elected and did not serve on the council of an area municipality. Mayors are the only members of Regional

TABLE 1

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF NIAGARA

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Niagara Falls, City	71,088	19.2	4	17,772	13.8	:head of council :3 regional councillors :(directly elected at large)
Port Colborne, City	18,653	5.1	2	9,327	6.9	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(directly elected at large)
St. Catharines City	123,014	33.3	7	17,573	24.1	:head of council :6 regional councillors :(directly elected at large)
Thorold, City	16,086	4.4	2	8,043	6.9	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(directly elected at large)
Welland, City	45,173	12.2	3	15,058	10.3	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(directly elected at large)
Fort Erie, Town	24,073	6.5	2	12,037	6.9	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(directly elected at large)
Grimsby, Town	16,719	4.5	2	8,360	6.9	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(directly elected at large)
Lincoln, Town	14,404	3.9	2	7,202	6.9	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(directly elected at large)

... continued

TABLE 1

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF NIAGARA

(Continued)

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Niagara-on-the-Lake, Town	12,359	3.3	2	6,180	6.9	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(directly elected at large)
Pelham, Town	11,835	3.2	1	11,835	3.5	:head of council
Wainfleet, Township	5,983	1.6	1	5,983	3.5	:head of council
West Lincoln, Township	9,925	2.7	1	9,925	3.5	:head of council
TOTAL	369,312	100.0	29 + Chairperson	-	100.0	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	12,735	-	-

Council who serve on both regional and local councils. Niagara has kept this system over the years and some other regions have switched from indirect election to direct election. There seems to be no interest in the Niagara area in moving in the direction of more indirectly-elected officials.

In the past few years, two main issues have stood out in the area of representation and accountability--the method of selection of the Regional Chairperson and the number of seats allocated to particular area municipalities. Both of these issues will be the subject of extensive discussion later in this report.

The method of selection of the Regional Chairperson has been the subject of study by a sub-committee of Council and has prompted much debate both in council and among the general public. The debate has been very complex because there are a number of options available. Currently, the Chairperson is selected by vote of Council at its first meeting after a municipal election. Council can select anyone to be the Chairperson. There is no requirement that the person be a member of Council or even a resident of the Region. The various options being considered will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.

In 1987, the Regional Council and concerned citizens of Niagara requested a comprehensive review of Regional Niagara by the Province of Ontario. In February 1988, the Niagara Region Review Commission was established and Professor Harry Kitchen of Trent University was appointed Chairman. The terms of reference of the Commission require that it consider the method of selecting the Regional Chairperson and the allocation of Regional Council seats.

MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO

In November 1986, the Task Force on Representation and Accountability in Metropolitan Toronto submitted its report to the Minister of Municipal Affairs entitled Analysis and Options for the Government of Metropolitan Toronto. The Task Force addressed the issues of representation, accountability, and responsiveness in Metro. As a result of recommendations of the Task Force, certain changes will be made in the electoral system for the 1988 municipal election. Tables 2 and 3 set out the details of both the new and the old system. The discussion below will present information about both the present system and the one which will be employed after the next election.

TABLE 2

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

RESTRUCTURED MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO

Effective December 1, 1988

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Metro's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Representatives	Population Per Representative	Percentage of Metro Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Metro Representatives
Etobicoke, City	298,490	13.85	5	59,698	14.71	:head of council :4 members :(direct)
North York, City	556,308	25.82	8	69,539	23.53	:head of council :7 members :(direct)
Scarborough, City	461,957	21.44	7	65,994	20.59	:head of council :6 members :(direct)
Toronto, City	606,247	28.14	9	67,361	26.47	:head of council :8 members :(direct)
York, City	133,856	6.21	3	44,619	8.82	:head of council :2 members :(direct)
East York, Borough	97,679	4.53	2	48,840	5.88	:head of council :1 member :(direct)
TOTAL	2,154,537	100.00	34 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	63,369	-	-

TABLE 3

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO

Present Structure Until November 30, 1988

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Metro's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Representatives	Population Per Representative	Percentage of Metro Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Metro Representatives
Etobicoke, City	298,490	13.85	5	59,698	12.82	:head of council :4 member Board of Control (indirect)
North York, City	556,308	25.82	10	55,631	25.64	:head of council :4 member Board of Control (indirect) :5 Metro councillors :(appointed by Council, indirect)
Scarborough, City	461,957	21.44	7	65,994	17.95	:head of council :4 member Board of Control (indirect) :2 Metro councillors :(appointed by Council, indirect)
Toronto, City	606,247	28.14	12	50,521	30.77	:head of council :11 members (top vote-getter in each ward, indirect)
York, City	133,856	6.21	3	44,619	7.69	:head of council :2 member Board of Control (indirect)
East York, Borough	97,679	4.53	2	48,840	5.13	:head of council :1 Metro councillor :(appointed by Council, indirect)
TOTAL	2,154,537	100.00	39 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	55,245	-	-

Method of Choosing Metropolitan Representatives

In the current system (table 3), the mayors of all area municipalities serve on Metro council. Additional members of councillor are selected in a variety of ways, but they are all indirectly elected, that is, they serve on both the Metro and area municipal councils. In the city of Toronto, which has two-member wards, the top vote-getter in each ward is automatically a member of both Metro and city councils. In municipalities with Boards of Control, the Controllers also serve on Metro Council. In some municipalities, Metro Councillors are chosen by a vote of council.

After the 1988 revisions in the system, the mayors of the six area municipalities will continue to serve as indirectly-elected members of council. The remaining twenty-eight representatives are directly-elected by the voters to serve on Metro Council and only on Metro Council. Each area municipality is divided into wards with one councillor elected from each ward.

Method of Selecting the Metropolitan Chairperson

The restructuring of Metro Council also affects the method of selecting the Chairperson. In the past, the Chairperson has been elected by vote of Metro Council at each council's inaugural meeting; that will not change. Under the current arrangement, the Council can choose anyone as Chairperson, a mayor of an area municipality or even someone who is not on Council. Under the revised legislation, only the directly elected members of Council are eligible to serve as Metro Chairperson. Mayors are excluded because serving as head of two councils could create a situation where there might be an appearance of a conflict of interest.

Table 3 indicates that in the current system the maximum variance between a municipality's percentage of the total population and its percentage of Metro councillors is less than four percentage points (Scarborough). Table 2 indicates that this maximum variance is reduced to less than three percentage points (York) in the 1988 restructuring. Thus, restructuring will improve the existing system of representation.

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF HAMILTON-WENTWORTH

Table 4 illustrates the electoral system of Hamilton-Wentworth. The main recent innovation in this region is a new method of selecting the Regional Chairperson. Prior to recent amendments to the Regional Municipality

TABLE 4

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF HAMILTON-WENTWORTH

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Hamilton, City	307,690	73.04	17	18,099	62.96	:head of council :16 regional councillors :(double direct)
Stoney Creek, City	41,964	9.96	2	20,982	7.41	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
Ancaster, Town	16,542	3.93	2	8,271	7.41	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
Dundas, Town	20,081	4.77	2	10,041	7.41	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
Flamborough, Town	25,541	6.06	2	12,771	7.41	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
Glanbrook, Township	9,446	2.24	2	4,723	7.41	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
TOTAL	421,264	100.00	27 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	15,602	-	-

of Hamilton-Wentworth Act, the Chairperson was elected by a majority vote of councillors at the inaugural meeting of council. Members of Council could select anyone to be Regional Chairperson; they were not restricted to members of Council.

In the 1988 election, the Chairperson will be selected by a popular election by the general public. This is the first time that direct election of a Regional Chairperson has been tried in Ontario.

There are particular characteristics of the Hamilton-Wentworth area that make direct election work well there. The entire region is clearly centred around one municipality. There is a television station, a major daily newspaper, and several radio stations covering the entire Hamilton-Wentworth area.

Since the City of Hamilton has the potential to dominate the Regional Council, because it has seventeen of the twenty-seven elected members, safeguards for the protection of minority interests are important. The safeguard employed in Hamilton-Wentworth is that representatives from at least three suburban municipalities must be present to constitute a quorum at a Council meeting. Recently, the suburban municipal representatives caused a furor when they held up certain actions of the Regional Council by refusing to attend meetings, thus ensuring that a quorum could not be attained.

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF OTTAWA-CARLETON

Table 5 illustrates the electoral system in Ottawa-Carleton. The mayors of the eleven area municipalities are ex officio members of Regional Council, while the remaining twenty-one members of Council are elected by a variety of different methods. All fifteen members of the council of the city of Ottawa serve on the Regional Council. The City of Nepean's three members are elected using the double direct method. Other councils select a member or members of the council to serve on the Regional Council by vote of the council.

The structure of the Regional Government is currently being reviewed by the Ottawa-Carleton Regional Review. The main recommendations of Phase I of the review were:

a) a regional council of thirty-six members (increased from thirty-three at present), structured to include the eleven mayors of the area municipalities and twenty-five other members,

TABLE 5

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF OTTAWA-CARLETON

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Gloucester, City	86,553	14.43	3	28,851	9.38	:head of council :2 aldermen :(chosen by council from amongst its own number, indirect)
Kanata, City	26,133	4.36	1	26,133	3.13	:head of council
Nepean, City	92,751	15.47	4	23,188	12.50	:head of council :3 aldermen :(at large, double direct)
Ottawa, City	304,448	50.77	16	19,028	50.00	:head of council :15 aldermen :(indirect)
Vanier, City	18,803	3.14	2	9,402	6.25	:head of council :1 alderman :(chosen by council from amongst its own number, indirect)
Rockcliffe Park, Village	2,323	.39	1	2,323	3.13	:head of council
Cumberland, Township	24,707	4.12	1	24,707	3.13	:head of council
Goulbourn, Township	11,824	1.97	1	11,824	3.13	:head of council
Osgoode, Township	10,850	1.81	1	10,850	3.13	:head of council
Rideau, Township	10,017	1.67	1	10,017	3.13	:head of council
West Carleton, Township	11,279	1.88	1	11,279	3.13	:head of council
TOTAL	599,688	100.00	32 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	18,740	-	-

b) regional councillors, other than the mayors, be elected to serve on the regional council only,

c) the regional chairperson be elected by the council from among the twenty-five directly-elected regional councillors (mayors not eligible), and that the person selected as chairperson not be required to vacate his/her elected seat. The chairperson will thus be accountable to a constituency as a member of council, and to the other councillors for his/her additional duties as chairperson.

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF YORK

Table 6 sets out the electoral system which will be effective in the Region of York for the next election. The changes reflect a recommendation made by the Ad Hoc Committee on Representation in 1984. The Committee recommended that, in future, each municipality receive one representative for each 21,000 residents, until the municipality exceeds a population of 105,000, at which point one representative should be added for each 35,000 additional residents. Because of certain historical anomalies, the system does exactly reflect this principle now.

COUNTY OF OXFORD

The representation patterns and voting systems of county governments are considerably different from those of regional governments. Table 7 illustrates the electoral system of Oxford County after its 1975 re-structuring.

The County Warden (head of council) is elected by a majority of councillors at the inaugural meeting following a general election. Only county representatives may be nominated for the position. The Warden holds office for the term of council and has a vote like any other member, since he or she is both a local representative and head of County Council.

Table 7 suggests that each municipality's percentage of the county's total population and its percentage of apportioned councillors are relatively similar. Thus, in the re-structured County of Oxford the representation by population principle is followed fairly closely.

TABLE 6

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF YORK

Effective December 1, 1988

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Aurora, Town	19,438	6.00	1	19,438	5.26	:head of council
East Gwillimbury, Town	13,991	4.32	1	13,991	5.26	:head of council
Markham, Town	105,341	32.51	5	21,068	26.32	:head of council :4 regional councillors :(double direct)
Newmarket, Town	33,186	10.24	2	16,593	10.52	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
Richmond Hill, Town	44,358	13.69	3	14,786	15.79	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct)
Vaughan, Town	56,766	17.52	3	18,922	15.79	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct)
Whitchurch-Stouffville, Town	14,353	4.43	1	14,353	5.26	:head of council
Georgina, Township	20,898	6.45	2	10,449	10.52	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
King, Township	15,733	4.85	1	15,733	10.52	:head of council
TOTAL	324,064	100.00	19 + Chairman	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	17,056	-	-

TABLE 7

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

COUNTY OF OXFORD

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of County's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of County Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing County Representatives
Woodstock, City	26,183	30.89	6	4,364	30.00	:head of council :5 county councillors :(double direct)
Ingersoll, Town	8,469	9.99	2	4,235	10.00	:head of council :1 county councillor :(double direct)
Tillsonburg, Town	10,563	12.46	2	5,282	10.00	:head of council :1 county councillor :(double direct)
Blandford-Blenheim, Township	6,623	7.81	2	3,312	10.00	:head of council :1 county councillor :(double direct)
East Zorra - Tavistock, Township	7,082	8.35	2	3,541	10.00	:head of council :1 county councillor :(double direct)
Norwich, Township	9,507	11.22	2	4,754	10.00	:head of council :1 county councillor :(double direct)
Southwest Oxford, Township	8,270	9.76	2	4,135	10.00	:head of council :1 county councillor :(double direct)
Zorra, Township	8,060	9.51	2	4,030	10.00	:head of council :1 county councillor :(double direct)
TOTAL	84,757	100.00	20 includes Warden	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	4,238	-	-

COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX

Middlesex illustrates the more traditional county structure; it has not been re-structured as Oxford has. On county councils, voting is done on a weighted basis, that is, the votes of representatives of larger municipalities are given greater weight than those of smaller municipalities.

The effect of this is to provide for a fairly small council of one or two representatives from each municipality, while still giving the larger municipalities a voting weight reflecting their population.

There are twenty-nine members on Middlesex County Council. Where there is one member on county council from a particular municipality, the representative is the reeve of the area municipality and where a second member is allowed, he or she is the deputy reeve.

TABLE 8

COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX

REPRESENTATION AND VOTING STRUCTURE

POPULATION RANGE OF MUNICIPALITY	TOTAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS	REEVE	NUMBER OF VOTES	DEPUTY REEVE	NUMBER OF VOTES
0 - 2,499	1	1	1	-	-
2,500 - 4,999	2	1	1	1	1
5,000 - 7,500	2	1	2	1	1
OVER - 7,500	2	1	2	1	2

Table 9 illustrates how the system works in practice. A small municipality like Newbury is entitled to one representative who has one vote. A much larger

TABLE 9

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Number of Qualified Electors	Percentage of County's Total Number of Qualified Electors	Total Number of Apportioned Representatives	Reeve: Number of Votes	Deputy Reeve: Number of Votes	Combined Number of Votes per Representative	Number of Qualified Electors Per Vote
Parkhill, Town	1,375	1,140	2.35	1	1	-	1	1,140
Strathroy, Town	9,051	6,500	13.40	2	2	1	3	2,167
Ailsa Craig, Village	832	689	1.42	1	1	-	1	689
Glencoe, Village	1,713	1,434	2.96	1	1	-	1	1,434
Lucan, Village	1,671	1,178	2.43	1	1	-	1	1,178
Newbury, Village	394	308	0.63	1	1	-	1	308
Wardsville, Village	456	427	0.88	1	1	-	1	427
Adelaide, Township	1,914	1,525	3.14	1	1	-	1	1,525
Biddulph, Township	2,251	1,695	3.49	1	1	-	1	1,695
Caradoc, Township	5,470	4,190	8.64	2	1	1	2	2,095
Delaware, Township	2,107	1,763	3.63	1	1	-	1	1,763
East Williams, Township	1,169	973	2.01	1	1	-	1	973

... continued

TABLE 9

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX
(Continued)

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Number of Qualified Electors	Percentage of County's Total Number of Qualified Electors	Total Number of Apportioned Representatives	Reeve: Number of Votes	Deputy Reeve: Number of Votes	Combined Number of Votes per Representative	Number of Qualified Electors Per Vote
Ekfrid, Township	2,072	1,676	3.45	1	1	-	1	1,676
Lobo, Township	4,889	3,683	7.59	2	1	1	2	1,842
London, Township	5,816	4,759	9.81	2	1	1	2	2,380
McGillivray, Township	1,763	1,388	2.86	1	1	-	1	1,388
Metcalfe, Township	851	780	1.61	1	1	-	1	780
Mosa, Township	1,282	1,129	2.33	1	1	-	1	1,129
North Dorchester, Township	6,832	5,063	10.44	2	2	1	3	1,688
Westminster, Township	6,159	4,905	10.11	2	1	1	2	2,453
West Nissouri, Township	3,266	2,551	5.26	2	1	1	2	1,276
West Williams, Township	945	760	1.57	1	1	-	1	760
TOTAL	62,278	48,516	100.00	29	24	7	31	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,565

municipality like Strathroy is entitled to two representatives with a total of three votes. This system is beneficial in limiting the size of council, but it deviates quite significantly from the principle of representation by population.

THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COUNTY GOVERNMENT

The entire county system of government has been under review in the last few years with a view to restructuring it. In November 1987, the Report of the Advisory Committee on County Government: Patterns for the Future was submitted to the Minister of Municipal Affairs. The committee recommended that the heads of councils of all constituent municipalities be members of county council and that each municipality be entitled to either one additional member or one additional vote for each 2,500 (or some other number chosen by the county) residents beyond the first 2,500. There is flexibility in whether additional votes or additional members are provided because the committee wanted to reduce the size of councils while still adhering roughly to the principle of representation by population.

OTHER REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS

Tables 10-16 provide electoral information on other regions and the District of Muskoka. These are included for the sake of completeness, but no additional commentary on them is needed because their structure is similar to the structures of the other municipalities discussed above.

AN OVERVIEW

Table 17 provides an overview of the electoral systems in upper tier municipalities in Ontario. It shows that Niagara has a larger number of area municipalities than any other regional government, although several counties have more constituent municipalities. The number of councillors in Niagara is also above average, but is far short of the largest number. Given the large number of municipalities in Niagara and the significant difference in their populations, it should not be surprising that the Niagara council is relatively large. While there is some concern about the alleged unwieldy size of the Niagara council, this might be the price paid for obtaining a good balance of representation across areas of diverse size.

TABLE 10

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF DURHAM

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Oshawa, City	121,669	38.72	11	11,061	36.67	:head of council :10 regional councillors :(double direct)
Ajax, Town	33,763	10.74	2	16,882	6.67	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
Newcastle, Town	32,712	10.41	4	8,178	13.33	:head of council :3 regional councillors :(double direct)
Pickering, Town	45,758	14.56	4	11,440	13.33	:head of council :3 regional councillors :(double direct)
Whitby, Town	44,241	14.08	3	14,747	10.00	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct)
Brock, Township	9,806	3.12	2	4,903	6.67	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
Skugog, Township	14,645	4.66	2	7,323	6.67	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
Uxbridge, Township	11,644	3.71	2	5,822	6.67	:head of council :1 regional councillor :(double direct)
TOTAL	314,238	100.00	30 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	10,475	-	-

TABLE 11

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF HALDIMAND-NORFOLK

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Nanticoke, City	20,071	22.70	4	5,018	21.05	:head of council :3 regional councillors :(double direct)
Dunnville, Town	11,289	12.77	3	3,763	15.79	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct)
Haldimand, Town	17,296	19.57	3	5,765	15.79	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct)
Simcoe, Town	14,196	16.06	3	4,732	15.79	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct)
Delhi, Township	14,796	16.74	3	4,932	15.79	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct)
Norfolk, Township	10,752	12.16	3	3,584	15.79	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct)
TOTAL	88,400	100.00	19 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	4,653	-	-

TABLE 12

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF HALTON

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Burlington, City	115,593	43.70	9	1,733	37.50	:head of council :8 regional councillors :(double direct)
Halton Hills, Town	34,703	13.12	5	6,941	20.83	:head of council :4 regional councillors :(double direct)
Milton, Town	30,988	11.72	3	10,329	12.50	:head of council :2 regional councillors :(double direct,
Oakville, Town	83,214	31.46	7	11,888	29.16	:head of council :6 regional councillors :(double direct)
TOTAL	264,498	100.00	24 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	11,021	-	-

TABLE 13

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Brampton, City	177,675	31.40	6	29,613	28.57	:head of council :5 regional councillors :(double direct)
Mississauga, City	359,495	63.53	10	35,950	47.62	:head of council :9 regional councillors :(double direct)
Caledon, Town	28,701	5.07	5	5,740	23.81	:head of council :4 regional councillors :(double direct, elected by wards)
TOTAL	565,871	100.00	21 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	26,946	-	-

TABLE 14

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF SUDBURY

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Sudbury, City	90,453	58.59	10	9,045	50	:head of council :9 members :(double direct)
Capreol, Town	3,722	2.41	1	3,722	5	:head of council
Nickel Centre, Town	11,548	7.48	2	5,774	10	:head of council :1 member :(double direct)
Onaping Falls, Town	5,614	3.64	1	5,614	5	:head of council
Rayside-Balfour, Town	14,183	9.19	2	7,092	10	:head of council :1 member :(double direct)
Valley East, Town	19,326	12.52	2	9,663	10	:head of council :1 member :(double direct)
Walden, Town	9,541	6.18	2	4,771	10	:head of council :1 member :(double direct)
TOTAL	154,387	100.00	20 + Chairperson	-	100	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	7,719	-	-

TABLE 15

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF WATERLOO

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of Regional Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing Regional Representatives
Cambridge, City	77,843	23.72	5	15,569	20.00	:head of council :4 members of council :(double direct)
Kitchener, City	147,439	44.92	9	16,382	36.00	:head of council :8 members of council :(elected by the members of council, indirect)
Waterloo, City	63,265	19.27	4	15,816	16.00	:head of council :3 members (who received highest number of votes)
North Dumfries, Township	5,082	1.55	1	5,082	4.00	:head of council
Wellesley, Township	6,916	2.11	1	6,916	4.00	:head of council
Wilmot, Township	11,018	3.36	2	5,509	8.00	:head of council :1 member (double direct - elected by general vote of electors of the area municipality)
Woolwich, Township	16,661	5.08	3	5,554	12.00	:head of council :2 members of council :(double direct)
TOTAL	328,224	100.00	25 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	13,129	-	-

TABLE 16

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY OF MUSKOKA

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of District's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Apportioned Councillors	Population Per Councillor	Percentage of District Councillors (%)	Method of Choosing District Representatives
Bracebridge, Town	9,322	24.57	4	2,331	18.18	:Mayor :3 members :(double direct)
Gravenhurst, Town	8,421	22.19	4	2,105	18.18	:Mayor :3 members :(double direct)
Huntsville, Town	11,438	30.15	4	2,860	18.18	:Mayor :3 members :(double direct)
Georgian Bay, Township	1,857	4.89	3	619	13.64	:Mayor :2 members :(direct)
Lake of Bays, Township	2,141	5.64	3	714	13.64	:Mayor :2 members :(direct)
Muskoka Lakes, Township	4,762	12.55	4	1,191	18.18	:Mayor :3 members :(double direct)
TOTAL	37,941	100.00	22 + Chairperson	-	100.00	-
AVERAGE	-	-	-	1,725	-	-

TABLE 17

OVERVIEW

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Information on Upper-Tier Municipalities
in Restructured Areas

Upper Tier Municipalities	Population 1985	Number of Area Municipalities	Number of Upper Tier Councillors including Chairperson	Average Population per Councillor	Date of Operation
Niagara	369,312	12	30	12,735	January 1, 1970
Metropolitan Toronto (Present)	2,154,537	6	40	55,245	January 1, 1954
Metropolitan Toronto (Restructured)	2,154,537	6	35	63,369	December 1, 1988
Hamilton-Wentworth	421,264	6	28	15,602	January 1, 1974
Ottawa-Carleton	599,688	11	33	18,740	January 1, 1969
York	324,064	9	20	17,056	January 1, 1971
Oxford	84,757	8	20	4,238	January 1, 1971
Middlesex	62,278	22	29	2,148	January 1, 1850
Durham	314,238	8	31	10,475	January 1, 1974
Haldimand-Norfolk	88,400	6	20	4,653	April 1, 1974
Halton	264,498	4	25	11,021	January 1, 1974
Peel	565,871	3	22	26,946	January 1, 1974
Sudbury	154,387	7	21	7,719	January 1, 1973
Waterloo	328,224	7	26	13,129	January 1, 1973
Muskoka	37,941	6	23	1,725	April 1, 1974

Q U E B E C

The province of Quebec employs two different forms of regional government. The three major urban areas and their suburbs are organized in communautés urbaines et régionale, and the rest of the southern portion of the province is organized into ninety-five municipalités régionales de comté.

THE COMMUNAUTÉS URBAINES ET RÉGIONALE

All three communautés urbaines et régionale were organized in 1969, and all three share an important characteristic with the Region of Niagara--significant differences in the populations of the constituent municipalities. But beyond this similarity, there are vast differences in the manner in which the three municipalities operate. However, all three CURs are relatively large local governments providing a broad range of services. Table 18 provides some information about their organization.

The Communauté urbaine de Montréal

The council of the Communauté urbaine de Montréal (CUM) is composed of eighty-six councillors. The entire fifty-eight members of the Montreal city council sit on the CUM council. The mayors of twenty-seven of the other twenty-eight municipalities also serve on the council. (One small municipality is represented by the mayor of an adjacent municipality.) The Chairperson of the Executive Committee (the head of council) also serves as a member of council.

Council business is conducted on the principle of weighted voting. Each mayor has one vote for each 1,000 residents. Similarly, each representative of the city of Montreal receives one vote per 1,000 residents of the city divided by the total number of representatives of the city. This strict adherence to voting based on population would allow the city of Montreal to dominate the CUM.

To counter this tendency and to ensure that both urban and suburban interests are considered, a double majority system is employed. This means that measures must receive majority support from councillors representing both the city and the surrounding municipalities.

TABLE 18

OVERVIEW OF STRUCTURES OF COMMUNAUTÉS URBAINES ET RÉGIONALE

	Number of Municipalities	Population	Number of Councillors	Population per Councillor
Communauté urbaine de Montréal	29	1,741,936	86	20,255
Communauté urbaine de Québec	13	457,600	32	14,300
Communauté régionale de l'Outaouais	11	194,180	18	10,788

The Council has an Executive Committee composed of six representatives of the city of Montreal and six from the other municipalities. A Chairperson, who is also the head of council, is chosen by vote of the full council from among these twelve. This person must resign his or her elected council seat and a by-election is held. In this committee, just as in full council, there are elaborate quorum and voting safeguards to ensure that neither the city nor the suburbs can dominate the policy making process.

The Communauté urbaine de Québec

In the council of the Communauté urbaine de Québec (CUQ), each area municipality is entitled to one representative for each 15,000 residents. However, regardless of size, each municipality is entitled to at least one representative. The mayor is always one of the representatives. The other representatives are chosen by the lower tier council from among their members. The CUQ council now has thirty-two members.

Each representative has one vote. In order for a motion to be carried, it must have a simple majority of all members voting and those in favour must represent at least five different municipalities.

The Communauté urbaine de Québec also has an Executive Committee. It is composed of nine members--the Chairperson of the Committee who must resign his or her seat, the mayors of the four largest municipalities, two additional representatives from Quebec, and two representatives from the smaller municipalities.

The Communauté régionale de l'Outaouais (Gatineau-Hull)

The Communauté régionale de l'Outaouais (CRO) is similar to Niagara in that it combines not only municipalities of diverse size, but also urban and rural areas. The council is composed of eighteen members. Hull and Gatineau are each represented by the mayor and three councillors. Aylmer is represented by its mayor and one additional councillor, and the other municipalities are each represented by their mayors. The additional councillors are chosen by the lower tier councils from among their members. Each member has one vote. Because of the relatively small size of council, the CRO does not have an executive committee.

The municipalités régionales de comté (MRC)

The MRCs were created in 1980 as a part of a general municipal re-organization and a revision of the land use planning function. They are diverse in terms of population, size, level of urbanization, and number of area municipalities subsumed. Some MRCs combine both incorporated and unincorporated areas so that in some areas they function as an upper tier government, but in others, they are the only local government.

As might be expected, the representation arrangements differ quite widely in the ninety-five MRCs. The only generalization which can be made is that the mayors of all constituent municipalities sit on the MRC council. One interesting feature found in some MRCs is the suspensive veto. In this case, the larger municipalities are somewhat under-represented on the basis of representation by population, but they are given the right to delay legislation for a period such as ninety days.

The MRCs were established primarily as a vehicle for land use planning. Now that official plans have been adopted in most areas, these organizations are at a crossroads. Legislation has recently been passed which allows an MRC to take over any function of the lower tier municipalities if the MRC council votes by a two-thirds majority to do so. Any lower tier can opt out of this arrangement for a particular function. This means that the service would not be provided in that municipality, the municipality would have its levy to the MRC reduced accordingly, and the representatives of the opted-out municipality would not be allowed to vote on decisions involving that service.

SOME LESSONS FROM QUEBEC

The purpose of discussing the Quebec situation is to determine if there are lessons which can be applied to Niagara. It seems that there are at least four lessons worthy of some additional thought.

Weighted voting. Federations whose constituent parts vary quite widely in size have a serious problem in establishing systems of representation. If the smallest unit is entitled to one representative and all other units receive a proportional share, the size of the legislative body can become very large. However, weighted voting gets around this by allowing politicians who represent larger numbers of people to have proportionally more votes.

In Montreal, this was done with a very large council, but it could also be used to keep the size of a council small. For example, Niagara Regional council could have two representatives from each municipality, but each member's vote would carry a different weight depending on the population of his or her municipality. This would keep council at a reasonable size, but still provide for a system of voting reflecting population patterns.

Voting rules to protect particular interests. There is sometimes an assumption that majority rule is the only acceptable dictum in a democracy. On the contrary, to protect some special interest, special voting rules might need to be invoked. For example, in the Communauté urbaine de Québec, a motion must receive a simple majority which includes the support of representatives of five municipalities. This ensures that the largest city cannot totally dominate the council. Alternatively, in some MRCs the larger cities are under-represented in number of votes, but they are provided with a suspensive veto.

One should not assume that majority rule is the only appropriate rule, more innovative formulas can be devised to serve particular purposes.

Different levies for different service levels. In some MRCs, services are not provided uniformly across all lower tier municipalities. Where a municipality does not receive a service, its payment to the MRC is reduced proportionately. This principle of different levies for different levels of service, akin to user charges, is already used routinely in Ontario municipalities which have different tax rates for urban and rural services.

Lack of uniform structure. In Quebec, there is no attempt to establish any kind of uniform structure across all regional governments. Each communauté urbaine et régionale has its own legislation and each MRC has its own letters patent. There is a wide variance in the structures and voting rules of these bodies. These organizations are encouraged to arrive at their own agreement on how they would like to be structured with the province generally confirming it.

By comparison, the Ontario system is quite uniform in structure. The Quebec system seems to indicate that a high degree of uniformity is not necessary to ensure that the system works well.

B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A

British Columbia's local government structure consists of incorporated municipalities (cities, villages, towns, and districts), regional districts, improvement districts and special purpose districts such as school and hospital districts.

HISTORY

British Columbia's system of local government was revised in 1965, when legislation amending the Municipal Act established twenty-eight regional districts covering the entire province. Regional districts combine municipal and non-municipal areas of the province so that in some places the regional district is an upper tier government and in other places it is the only municipal government.

British Columbia's reasons for the regionalization of local government are similar to those expressed by the Province of Ontario in the 1960s. The proliferation of inter-municipal special purpose bodies and the increased demand for municipal services required the creation of some type of regional governing unit. Regional districts were created to provide a federated approach to local problems which transcended individual municipal concerns.

In developing the regional district concept, several key principles were addressed by the legislation. First, the Province wanted to preserve the existing local government structure by allowing municipalities to remain independent within the regional framework. Municipal independence was reinforced by barring the regional district from having any direct taxing powers. The regional districts are funded by provincial transfer payments and levies from the constituent municipalities.

Second, non-municipal or unincorporated areas were given the opportunity of choosing whether they wanted to receive services from the regional district on an individual basis. There was no compulsion for an unincorporated area to accept the services offered by the regional district.

CORPORATE STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL DISTRICT

The cabinet determines the voting structure for each district individually. The principle employed is the same across the entire province, but the actual numbers vary substantially.

The governing body of a regional district is the Board of Directors. The Board functions on the basis of weighted voting similar to the system described in Quebec. The number of votes (not the same as the number of directors) to which each lower tier municipality or electoral area is entitled is obtained by dividing its population by some divisor established by cabinet. The divisor is different for each regional district. For example, if an area had a population of 155,000 and a voting unit of 15,000, it would be assigned eleven votes on the Board of Directors (155,000/ 15,000 = 10.33). The quotient is always rounded up to the next whole number.

The number of directors to which each municipality or electoral area is entitled is obtained by dividing the number of votes of the area municipality by five and raising the result to the next integer where applicable. Using the example above, a municipality or electoral area with eleven votes would be assigned three directors (11/ 5 = 2.2 or 3). The eleven votes are equally distributed among municipal directors. Through this system of weighted voting, a single director can have as many as five votes, which must be cast as a single block.

All directors are not necessarily entitled to vote on every issue. As mentioned above, lower tier municipalities have the right to opt out of regional services. When a municipality exercises this right, its regional levy is reduced accordingly and its directors cannot vote on matters affecting that service. A decision to begin providing a service requires the approval of two-thirds of the directors casting two-thirds of the votes representing two-thirds of the municipal and electoral areas. These voting criteria prevent the domination of the council by either a single large municipality or a combination of many small villages or electoral areas.

APPOINTMENT/ELECTION AND TERM OF OFFICE

In incorporated areas, municipal council appoints regional director(s) to the regional district to serve for a one-year term. In unincorporated areas, directors are elected by qualified voters at the same time as the municipal elections and serve on regional district council for a two-year term.

The Municipal Act stipulates that the regional board is to elect a chairman and vice-chairman by a majority vote of its directors at the first meeting held after each December 1. The powers and duties of the chairman are similar to those of a mayor.

The preceding information provides a broad conceptual framework describing the regional district system of local government in British Columbia. The following section on the Regional District of Fraser- Fort George serves as a snapshot of a regional district in British Columbia.

REGIONAL DISTRICT OF FRASER-FORT GEORGE

The Regional District of Fraser-Fort George was incorporated on March 8, 1967 and is composed of four member municipalities and seven electoral areas. The number of votes for each municipality or electoral area is determined by dividing the 1986 population figures listed in table 19 by 4,000. The number of directors to which each municipality or electoral area is entitled is determined by dividing the municipality's total number of votes by five and raising it to the next integer. For example, the City of Prince George has seventeen votes divided by five which equals four directors.

SOME LESSONS FROM BRITISH COLUMBIA

Certain municipalities in the Niagara region have voiced their desire to have increased representation on council. This raises the problem of increasing the size of council. One of the lessons Regional Niagara could learn from British Columbia's local government experience is the principle of weighted voting.

Weighted voting is not foreign to Ontario. It has been in use in the county system for many years. Table 20 illustrates how the B.C. system could be applied to Niagara using a divisor of 10,000. This would decrease the number of councillors to fifteen, but the forty-three votes they would cast would allow for adherence to the principle of representation by population.

TABLE 19

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REGIONAL DISTRICT OF FRASER - FORT GEORGE

MEMBER MUNICIPALITIES	1986 POPULATION	VOTING UNIT	TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES	NUMBER OF DIRECTORS
City of Prince George	67,621	4,000	17	4
District of Mackenzie	5,542	4,000	2	1
Village of McBride	592	4,000	1	1
Village of Valemount	1,161	4,000	1	1
ELECTORAL AREAS				
Salmon River - Lakes	2,512	4,000	1	1
Chilako River - Nechako	2,579	4,000	1	1
Tabor Lake - Stone Creek	4,188	4,000	2	1
Woodpecker - Hixon	617	4,000	1	1
Willow River - Upper Fraser	1,741	4,000	1	1
Crooked River - Parsnip	670	4,000	1	1
Robson Valley - Canoe	2,114	4,000	1	1
TOTAL	89,337	-	29	14

TABLE 20

REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

A RESTRUCTURED REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF NIAGARA
(Voting Unit - 10,000)

Area Municipality	1985 Population	Percentage of Region's Total Population (%)	Total Number of Votes	Percentage of Total Votes	Number of Directors
Niagara Falls, City	71,088	19.2	8	18.6	2
Port Colborne, City	18,653	5.1	2	4.6	1
St. Catharines City	123,014	33.3	13	30.2	3
Thorold, City	16,086	4.4	2	4.6	1
Welland, City	45,173	12.2	5	11.6	1
Fort Erie, Town	24,073	6.5	3	7.0	1
Grimsby, Town	16,719	4.5	2	4.6	1
Lincoln, Town	14,404	3.9	2	4.6	1
Niagara-on-the-Lake, Town	12,359	3.3	2	4.6	1
Pelham Town	11,835	3.2	2	4.6	1
Wainfleet, Township	5,983	1.6	1	2.3	1
West Lincoln, Township	9,925	2.7	1	2.3	1
TOTAL	369,312	100.0	43	100.0	15 + Chairperson

SOME ALTERNATIVES FOR THE REGION OF NIAGARA

THE ELECTION OF REGIONAL COUNCILLORS

A number of different formulas could be used to apportion representatives among the area municipalities. This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of some of these.

The ideal apportionment formula balances four concerns:

-strict representation by population

-protection of minority interests

-an optimum size of council

-an electoral system which is readily understandable to the average citizen

In democratic societies, there is a strong predisposition toward majority will and representation by population. However, there is also a recognition that minorities must have an appropriate voice in government and that minority views must carry some weight in deliberations. In the United States federal system, these principles are balanced by having one house in which representation is apportioned strictly by population and a second house in which each state is represented equally. This is obviously not a viable solution for local government, but the formula chosen must provide some mechanism to protect minority interests.

There is also some concern about the overall size of council. The usual feeling is that the current twenty-nine member council is a bit too large and unwieldy to be a good debating forum. The size of council is also seen as a financial issue. Since the current annual remuneration of a councillor is almost $10,000, each additional councillor will increase regional expenditure by that amount.

However, there are dangers in having a council which is too small. In interviews, councillors occasionally expressed concern about the workload which they carried on certain committees and the difficulty of obtaining a quorum at committee meetings particularly in the summer months.

The argument about the increased cost of a larger council does not seem compelling. If the size of

council were increased, it would result in a very small increase in taxes, less than three cents per capita for each additional councillor. This may be a small price to pay for a system that could be improved through increased representation.

In the responses to the questionnaires reported in the appendix, councillors did not express a strong desire for a reduction in the size of council, nor did they express great dismay at a slight increase in the size of council. This suggests that there is little unrest about the current council size, and that a small increase would be acceptable if sound arguments can be made for enlarging it.

The fourth criterion requires that the electoral system be readily understood by the average citizen. Citizens have many conflicting demands on their time. While one could design an elaborate system which would satisfy the other criteria, it would not be acceptable if it was so awkward and cumbersome that the average citizen would have to expend great amounts of time in mastering its intricacies. Simplicity is a virtue in this case, because if citizens do not understand the system, they lose confidence in the whole system of local government.

The conflict inherent in these four criteria must be weighed carefully. On the one hand, a council which adhered closely to the principle of representation by population would tend to be quite large and unwieldy, and might not allow for the protection of minority interests. On the other hand, excessive safeguards for minority interests might require significant deviation from representation by population and could allow the minority to thwart the desires of the majority.

The rest of this section will compare alternative formats for apportioning representatives among the area municipalities. Given the inherent conflict between some criteria, it is not surprising that none of the systems discussed below stands out as satisfying all four criteria. Usually, what is gained as measured by one criterion is lost on another. The best solution will be the one which most successfully balances all four criteria.

Status Quo

Table 21 sets out the existing system. There are always benefits in maintaining the status quo. It has been in existence (with one small modification) since

TABLE 21

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ALLOCATING COUNCILLORS

EXISTING SYSTEM

	Number of Councillors	% of Councillors	Population	% of Population	Over/Under Representation
Fort Erie	2	6.9	24,073	6.5	0.4
Grimsby	2	6.9	16,719	4.5	2.4
Lincoln	2	6.9	14,404	3.9	3.0
Niagara Falls	4	13.8	71,088	19.2	-5.5
Niagara-on-the-Lake	2	6.9	12,359	3.3	3.6
Pelham	1	3.4	11,835	3.2	0.2
Port Colborne	2	6.9	18,653	5.1	1.8
St. Catharines	7	24.1	123,014	33.3	-9.2
Thorold	2	6.9	16,086	4.4	2.5
Wainfleet	1	3.4	5,983	1.6	1.8
Welland	3	10.3	45,173	12.2	-1.9
West Lincoln	1	3.4	9,925	2.7	0.8
TOTAL	29	100.0	369,312	100.0	33.0

the Region began in 1970 and all of the participants understand its operation.

The extreme right column of this table illustrates a measure of the level of over and under-representation. This measure is calculated by taking the difference between the percentage of councillors elected by an area municipality and the percentage of the population residing in that municipality. If a municipality were perfectly represented, this difference would be zero.

The total over/under-representation generated by a particular system is the sum of the absolute values (ignoring plus or minus signs) of the percentages for each municipality. The absolute values must be used because the mathematical sum of the under and over-representation will always be zero, that is, the total of over-representation will always equal the total of under-representation. The "rep-by-pop" value will be best served by the scheme generating the lowest total.

The existing structure generates a fairly high level of over/under representation (33.0), but this is almost inevitable in a region containing municipalities with a diversity of population.

The major criticisms of the existing structure have come from the large municipalities which are under-represented and from some of the smaller municipalities which feel they should have more than one seat on council. In fact, some people have argued that all municipalities should have at least two representatives because this is the only way to ensure proper representation on the main committees of regional government where so much of council's work is done.

One change which could be made in the status quo or in a number of the other systems to be discussed below would be the use of a ward system to select regional councillors in cities with a large number of elected councillors. Some interest has been expressed in this idea in St. Catharines in particular. The concern is that the size of the constituency makes it very difficult and expensive to run a good campaign. This particularly works against new candidates seeking to be elected to council for the first time.

Equal Representation

The simplest formula to understand and apply would give each municipality an equal number of representatives. In the case of Niagara, two representatives per municipality would generate a

council of twenty-four members. This is the alternative set out in table 22.

This reduction in the size of council might make for a better debating environment, although it is doubtful that such a relatively small reduction would cause a significant change in the style of debate. It would also provide for protection of minority interests because each municipality would have an equal vote and equal representation on committees. If all members voted, any measure would require votes from at least seven of the twelve municipalities before it would be passed.

Not surprisingly, this alternative has the highest level of over/under-representation of any formula that will be considered.

The Wainfleet Formula

The formula set out in table 23 assumes that the smallest area municipality, Wainfleet, should have one representative. It then takes the population of that municipality, 5,983, and allocates seats to other municipalities on the basis of one for each 5,983 residents. Rounding is done in the usual fashion.

Not surprisingly, this formula generates the lowest level of over/under-representation. It is very fair in that sense.

A disadvantage of this system is that it is quite weak in the protection of minority interests. The two largest municipalities could conceivably control any vote of council. However, the major weakness of this scheme is the size of council that would be generated. A council of sixty-two people would make meaningful debate virtually impossible and would require the construction of a new council chamber.

This alternative is probably not a serious possibility, but it is interesting to note the size of council needed to generate equity in terms of representation-by-population.

The Wainfleet ÷ 2 Formula

The formula set out in table 24 takes the number of representatives generated by the Wainfleet formula and divides that result by two for each municipality except Wainfleet.

TABLE 22

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ALLOCATING COUNCILLORS

EQUAL REPRESENTATION

	Number of Councillors	% of Councillors	Population	% of Population	Over/Under Representation
Fort Erie	2	8.3	24,073	6.5	1.8
Grimsby	2	8.3	16,719	4.5	3.8
Lincoln	2	8.3	14,404	3.9	4.4
Niagara Falls	2	8.3	71,088	19.2	-10.9
Niagara-on-the-Lake	2	8.3	12,359	3.3	5.0
Pelham	2	8.3	11,835	3.2	5.1
Port Colborne	2	8.3	18,653	5.1	3.3
St. Catharines	2	8.3	123,014	33.3	-25.0
Thorold	2	8.3	16,086	4.4	4.0
Wainfleet	2	8.3	5,983	1.6	6.7
Welland	2	8.3	45,173	12.2	-3.9
West Lincoln	2	8.3	9,925	2.7	5.6
TOTAL	24	100.0	369,312	100.0	69.5

TABLE 23

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ALLOCATING COUNCILLORS

THE WAINFLEET FORMULA

	Number of Councillors	% of Councillors	Population	% of Population	Over/Under Representation
Fort Erie	4	6.5	24,073	6.5	-0.1
Grimsby	3	4.8	16,719	4.5	0.3
Lincoln	2	3.2	14,404	3.9	-0.7
Niagara Falls	11	17.7	71,088	19.2	-1.5
Niagara-on-the-Lake	2	3.2	12,359	3.3	-0.1
Pelham	2	3.2	11,835	3.2	0.0
Port Colborne	3	4.8	18,653	5.1	-0.2
St. Catharines	21	33.9	123,014	33.3	0.6
Thorold	3	4.8	16,086	4.4	0.5
Wainfleet	1	1.6	5,983	1.6	0.0
Welland	8	12.9	45,173	12.2	0.7
West Lincoln	2	3.2	9,925	2.7	0.5
TOTAL	62	100.0	369,312	100.0	4.1

TABLE 24

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ALLOCATING COUNCILLORS

THE WAINFLEET/2 FORMULA

	Number of Councillors	% of Councillors	Population	% of Population	Over/Under Representation
Fort Erie	2	6.5	24,073	6.5	-0.1
Grimsby	1	3.2	16,719	4.5	-1.3
Lincoln	1	3.2	14,404	3.9	-0.7
Niagara Falls	6	19.4	71,088	19.2	0.1
Niagara-on-the-Lake	1	3.2	12,359	3.3	-0.1
Pelham	1	3.2	11,835	3.2	0.0
Port Colborne	2	6.5	18,653	5.1	1.4
St. Catharines	10	32.3	123,014	33.3	-1.1
Thorold	1	3.2	16,086	4.4	-1.1
Wainfleet	1	3.2	5,983	1.6	1.6
Welland	4	12.9	45,173	12.2	0.7
West Lincoln	1	3.2	9,925	2.7	0.5
TOTAL	31	100.0	369,312	100.0	8.7

This formula has a number of attractive features. It produces a council only slightly larger than the existing one and its level of over/under-representation is only slightly higher than that of the Wainfleet formula.

On the negative side, under this formula seven of the twelve area municipalities have only one representative. This is a problem because it may be difficult for one representative to do a good job at full council and in all of the committees on which the municipality should be represented. Like the Wainfleet formula, this formula also means that the two largest municipalities have a majority of councillors.

The 20/20 Formula

Under this formula set out in table 25, each municipality would be entitled to two representatives for its first 20,000 residents (or any part thereof) and one additional representative for each additional 20,000 residents (or any part thereof). In some cases, municipalities receive an extra councillor for a fairly small increment above the 20,000. This may be desirable because it helps to offset the advantage given to smaller municipalities by the formula.

The 20/20 formula provides each municipality with at least two representatives. This means that there will be sufficient representation from each municipality to provide improved representation on all committees. It tempers the strict "rep-by-pop" idea by favouring the smaller municipalities, but it retains the idea that more populous municipalities are entitled to some additional representation. In this system, councillors from at least four municipalities must support a proposal before it can be accepted.

On the negative side, this system creates a somewhat larger council than the present one, although it is not as large as councils in some other regions. This system produces a level of over/under-representation significantly larger than the previous formulas, although it is only slightly larger than the status quo.

This formula provides for a larger increase in the number of councillors than an other formula considered. However, an increase of six councillors would cost less than eighteen cents per capita.

TABLE 25

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ALLOCATING COUNCILLORS

20/20

	Number of Councillors	% of Councillors	Population	% of Population	Over/Under Representation
Fort Erie	3	8.3	24,073	6.5	1.8
Grimsby	2	5.6	16,719	4.5	1.0
Lincoln	2	5.6	14,404	3.9	1.7
Niagara Falls	5	13.9	71,088	19.2	-5.4
Niagara-on-the-Lake	2	5.6	12,359	3.3	2.2
Pelham	2	5.6	11,835	3.2	2.4
Port Colborne	2	5.6	18,653	5.1	0.5
St. Catharines	8	22.2	123,014	33.3	-11.1
Thorold	2	5.6	16,086	4.4	1.2
Wainfleet	2	5.6	5,983	1.6	3.9
Welland	4	11.1	45,173	12.2	-1.1
West Lincoln	2	5.6	9,925	2.7	2.9
TOTAL	36	100.0	369,312	100.0	35.1

Regional Wards

Another possible method of election would be to ignore the existing municipal boundaries and divide the region into wards solely for the purposes of the regional election.

This system has the advantage of providing maximum flexibility. The optimum number of councillors could be determined and the appropriate number of wards established. Since there would be no need to conform to existing municipal boundaries, the ward boundaries could be drawn to ensure equality of representation. Problems of under or over-representation would disappear if boundaries were drawn carefully.

Another advantage of this system is that it could reduce parochialism and force councillors to think regionally, since they would no longer be representatives of particular municipalities.

There are a number of potential problems with this arrangement. First, imposing a new set of ward boundaries which have nothing in common with the existing ones might be confusing to voters. However, boundaries of federal and provincial ridings do not always respect municipal boundaries. Second, there is no assurance that there will always be a representative from each municipality. In fact, the numbers might require that municipalities be combined or fragmented in such a way that some municipalities might be chronically under-represented.

Regional Wards plus the Mayors

A variation on the above model would have the mayors of the area municipalities automatically serve on Regional Council with additional members being elected from regional wards. For example, one could select an optimum size of council, say, thirty. The mayors would fill twelve of those seats, and the other members of Council would be selected from eighteen regional wards drawn without regard to municipal boundaries.

This would have the advantage of retaining the mayors as members of Regional Council and it would tend to reduce the parochialism of the other councillors. It would also ensure that each municipality would have at least one representative on Regional Council who was a resident of that municipality. In fact, each municipality would have at least two people representing it, although in some cases it would be sharing one of its members with an adjacent municipality.

It would have the same disadvantage of the previous model of introducing a new set of ward boundaries which might be confusing to voters.

Weighted Voting

Weighted voting assigns a different weight to the vote of each representative usually depending on the number of voters he or she represents. This system is employed in regional governments in Quebec and British Columbia, and in counties in Ontario. It has never been employed in regional governments in Ontario. Any system which is used so widely is certainly worthy of consideration.

Its main advantage is that it could provide a relatively small council which would still reflect population patterns in voting. The perfectly representative model above required sixty-two councillors. With a system of weighted voting, one could decide to have, say, two councillors from each municipality, but weight the votes of those two councillors so that they reflect the relative sizes of the populations they represent.

A potential disadvantage of this is that it could allow the larger municipalities to totally dominate the system. The two largest municipalities have over fifty per cent of the population and so could control the council completely. Minority interests might not be appropriately protected. Of course, the weighting does not have to be exactly proportional. The weighting could be set to reflect only partially the full population strength of the larger areas.

Innovative Voting Systems

The concern is sometimes expressed that a small number of large municipalities could dominate the system to the detriment of the smaller ones. One way of dealing with wide disparities in the voting power of municipalities is to introduce voting systems which are not based strictly on majority rule.

The smaller municipalities could be given greater influence by such voting rules as requiring that a motion must have:

- a simple majority of votes, but those voting must represent some minimum number of municipalities, or

-a double majority--a majority of councillors representing large municipalities and a majority representing smaller municipalities.

These systems hold a real attraction in terms of protecting the rights of minorities, but there is at least one major problem with them. They must be constructed very carefully or they could be a prescription for a stalemate and the thwarting of the majority will by a well-organized minority. An additional problem is that systems could become so complex that it would be difficult for the average person, who follows council proceedings only casually, to understand them.

Representation and Assessment

A brief comment should be made about one system which was not investigated. It has sometimes been suggested that a municipality's representation should be linked to its assessment base, since this is what determines its financial contribution to regional government.

This argument should be rejected on principle. Electoral systems do not allow a person who is wealthier or pays more taxes to have additional votes. This almost smacks of buying votes. This kind of thinking is quite foreign to usual Canadian ideas of equality.

However, even if this proposal were not rejected on principle, table 26 indicates that population is quite directly related to the total assessment base of the area municipalities. Using assessment instead of population would likely produce the same result in terms of the allocation of seats.

A Comparison of the Systems

Table 27 compares the systems discussed above. There is no clear winner on every criterion. This should not be surprising, given the contradictory nature of some of the criteria. For example, the "Wainfleet" formula which is rated as excellent on representation is very poor in terms of protecting minority interests, while inversely, the "Equal Representation" option is excellent in protecting minority interests, but very poor in terms of representation.

The fact that no system stands out as ideal on all counts makes the choice of system very difficult. In the absence of an ideal system, a choice must be made which balances the conflicting criteria.

TABLE 26

COMPARISON OF POPULATION AND EQUALIZED ASSESSMENT

	Population	% of Population	Equalized Assessment (thousands)	% of Assessment
St. Catharines	123,014	33.3	290,694	31.4
Niagara Falls	71,088	19.2	200,265	21.6
Welland	45,173	12.2	116,460	12.6
Fort Erie	24,073	6.5	65,445	7.1
Port Colborne	18,653	5.1	49,058	5.3
Grimsby	16,719	4.5	38,228	4.1
Thorold	16,086	4.4	48,439	5.2
Lincoln	14,404	3.9	30,200	3.3
Niagara-on-the-Lake	12,359	3.3	28,356	3.1
Pelham	11,835	3.2	26,644	2.9
West Lincoln	9,925	2.7	19,404	2.1
Wainfleet	5,983	1.6	12,840	1.4
TOTAL	369,312	100.0	926,033	100.0

TABLE 27

COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

	REPRESENTATION	MINORITY INTERESTS	COUNCIL SIZE	EASE OF UNDERSTANDING
STATUS QUO	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	GOOD	GOOD
EQUAL	VERY POOR	EXCELLENT	MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY	EXCELLENT
WAINFLEET	EXCELLENT	VERY POOR	VERY POOR	EXCELLENT
WAINFLEET/2	GOOD	NOT GOOD	GOOD	EXCELLENT
20/20	MEDIUM	GOOD	GOOD	EXCELLENT
REGIONAL WARDS	EXCELLENT	GOOD	MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY	POOR
REGIONAL WARDS PLUS MAYORS	EXCELLENT	GOOD	FLEXIBLE	NOT GOOD
WEIGHTED VOTING	DEPENDS ON	FORMULA	MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY	NOT GOOD
INNOVATIVE VOTING SYSTEMS	EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON SPECIFICS OF SYSTEM ADOPTED			

Should Mayors Serve as Members of Council?

The subject of the role of mayors on Regional Council has been an issue recently. In interviews, some councillors suggested that mayors are too busy with the work of their municipalities to devote enough attention to Regional matters. In the questionnaire administered to councillors (results are summarized in the appendix), fifteen of twenty-six respondents agreed with the statement that "Mayors give less time to Regional affairs than other Regional Councillors do."

However, other councillors pointed to some mayors who seemed to be making a significant contribution to Regional activities. In fact, four of the Region's six standing committees are currently chaired by mayors. But even if mayors do not have the time to play a full role in Regional activities, they could still serve a useful purpose in providing liaison between the two tiers. This is probably why twenty of twenty-six respondents felt that mayors should continue to serve on Regional Council.

On balance, it would seem that not allowing mayors to serve on Regional Council deprives Council of experienced and senior members who could play a valuable role in maintaining communications between the two tiers. For this reason, mayors should continue to be ex officio members of Regional Council.

THE OFFICE OF REGIONAL CHAIRPERSON:

ISSUES AND CONCERNS

CURRENT METHOD OF SELECTING THE CHAIRPERSON

The Report of the Niagara Region Local Government Review (the Mayo Report), was a comprehensive examination of the governing structures of Lincoln and Welland counties leading to the creation of Regional Niagara. The Report recommended that this new government have as its head of council a Chairperson chosen by the councillors from among the directly-elected members (that is, not including mayors) of council. The Report also suggested that the province appoint the first Chairperson to facilitate the harmonious introduction of the upper tier system. Furthermore, Mayo recommended that the Chairperson's job be a full-time position with a salary commensurate with the importance of the office.

The Report specifically rejected the option of at-large election of the Regional Chairperson by the general public for three reasons. First, good candidates would be lost to council for the full term of office if they failed to be elected as Chairperson. Second, a directly-elected Chairperson could attempt to strengthen the office in a manner foreign to the local government system in Ontario. Third, direct election creates two classes of councillors--a Chairperson elected by the citizens of the entire Region and an ordinary regional councillor elected by the citizens of a single municipality. A Chairperson with a popular mandate from the entire Region could come into conflict with elected representatives with smaller mandates.

The province followed most of the advice of the Mayo Commission on the selection of the Regional Chairperson, except that the Regional Municipality of Niagara Act did not restrict election to just directly-elected Regional Councillors. Instead, the legislation allows anyone to be selected as Regional Chairperson. There is no requirement that the Chairperson be a regional councillor or even a resident of the region. This provision has been a source of continuing controversy.

Election of the Chairperson occurs at the inaugural meeting of council. According to the Region's procedure by-law, the election of the Chairperson is an open process. It involves nominations, an opportunity for each candidate to speak, and an open election process in

which one nominee is dropped from the list after each ballot, until there is majority agreement on one individual.

However, what actually happened in 1985 (the only time when there has been a contested election) was that councillors met in private caucus, cast their votes secretly in a lengthy series of ballots, and arrived at an informal, non-binding decision about who should be the next Chairperson. The procedure by-law was then followed in a pro forma fashion at the first official meeting of Council. There was only one nominee for the office at this formal Council meeting.

The current legislation requires the Chairperson to relinquish his or her seat on local council. The local council then arranges to fill the seat either through by-election or by an appointment. This procedure has also been the source of some controversy. Some have suggested that the Chairperson should retain his or her seat and thus avoid the expense of a by-election.

POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE REGIONAL CHAIRPERSON

Section 14(1) of the Regional Municipality of Niagara Act stipulates that the Chairperson is both the head of Regional Council and the chief executive officer of the Regional Corporation. In Ontario, with its weak mayor system of local government, the head of council has a statutory responsibility to chair council meetings, but other than this, his or her powers and responsibilities are not different from those of any other councillor. In one way, the Chairperson has even less power than other councillors; the Chairperson can only vote in Council to break a tie.

While the Chairperson does not have a great deal of statutory power, he or she does have certain important levers of influence. The Chairperson is an ex officio member of all standing committees. He or she is the only full-time Regional politician so that the incumbent has a higher public profile and usually greater informal influence than other councillors, allowing him or her to carve out a leadership role within Regional Council. However, it is important to remember that the Chairperson's role is largely what he or she makes of it; it possesses no statutory responsibility beyond that of any other councillor.

The Niagara Region Study Review Commission, 1975-1977, (the Archer Commission) was a second generation review of the Regional Municipality of Niagara. The Archer Report favoured the present method of selecting

the Chairperson and did not make any recommendations to change the present system. The Commission did comment, however, on how the role of the Regional Chairperson could be improved by giving him or her a stronger role in the activities of council. This could be achieved in two ways.

First, the Commission recommended the establishment of a Co-ordinating Committee of Regional Council. This committee would be chaired by the Regional Chairperson and its primary function would be to "act as a liaison for gathering and presenting information to enable council to make better decisions and to co-ordinate the activities of the various arms of the Regional Government." (The Archer Report, p. 24-25).

Second, the Commission suggested that the Chairperson take a more proactive approach in disseminating information about the benefits of regional government in Niagara. The Commission argued that the Chairperson should use the status of the office as a vehicle for increasing the public's understanding of regional government. The Commission argued that the Chairperson's duties should involve more than just persuading, guiding and expediting Council matters, rather the Chairperson must truly act as the symbolic and actual head of the government of Regional Niagara.

PROPOSED METHODS OF SELECTING THE REGIONAL CHAIRPERSON

As mentioned above, there have been a number of concerns surrounding the office of the Regional Chairperson in the last few years. The purpose of this section is to discuss these issues and to outline all aspects of this debate.

The method of selecting the regional chairperson has been a subject of controversy in most regions. This section examines the representation and accountability aspects of the various models for selection of the Regional Chairperson.

Selection by Regional Councillors

Currently, the Chairperson is selected by vote of Regional Councillors at the inaugural meeting of each new council. The main advantage of this system is that it ensures that the Chairperson will have the confidence and support of the majority of councillors at the time of the election. This should assist the Chairperson considerably in establishing a leadership role on Council.

Two arguments are sometimes made about the "alleged" undemocratic nature of the current procedure. First, non-elected persons are eligible to be elected as Regional Chairperson. Second, the Regional Chairperson is not directly accountable to the general population of the Region when he or she is elected by a constituency of only twenty-nine people.

These are obviously serious concerns which must be given great weight. However, they should be put in perspective by considering two points. First, the twenty-nine Regional Councillors making the selection are themselves elected by and accountable to the general public. This establishes an indirect accountability link between the general public and the Chairperson, not unlike the link found in parliamentary systems in which neither the Prime Minster nor provincial premiers are directly elected.

Second, the real role of the Chairperson must be kept in perspective. He or she does have a certain amount of informal influence with other councillors, but in terms of statutory powers, the Chairperson is not significantly different from other councillors.

Selection of Chairperson Three Months Before the Municipal Election

This system still involves selection of the Regional Chairperson by regional councillors. However, it requires a council, close to the end of its term, to select the Chairperson for the next Regional Council.

This system is similar to the previous system and has many of the same strengths and weaknesses. However, it does have certain advantages over the previous system.

Currently, voting on the selection of a Chairperson is the first decision taken by a new councillor, even though he or she might not be familiar with the candidates. Under this revised system, the decision would be made by experienced councillors who have worked with most, if not all, of the front-running candidates for at least three years. Councillors could judge the nominees' strengths and weaknesses based on their performance over that period.

This method provides the least disruption and uncertainty. Since the identity of the Chairperson will be known before the election, there is no need to go through the procedure of someone resigning his or her seat and then holding a by-election. Furthermore, an individual who is undecided if he or she wants to run

for Regional Chairperson or mayor of a municipality can run for the office of Chairperson and, if unsuccessful, will still have an opportunity to enter the mayor's race.

The main disadvantage of this system is that the Chairperson of a council is chosen by the previous council. Thus, newly elected regional councillors do not have the opportunity to participate in the selection process. The extent of this disadvantage is proportional to the number of newly elected councillors. If there were a major change in councillors, the new chairperson could head a council on which he or she may have little support.

Election by the General Public

There is some support for the election of the Regional Chairperson by a Region-wide election on municipal election day.

A Chairperson, directly elected by all qualified voters, is directly accountable to the citizens of the Region. The Chairperson would have a popular mandate giving the office greater political influence and credibility. An at-large election would alleviate the concern that the Chairperson is not accountable to the citizens of the Region.

Direct election may be an attractive option. In the next municipal election, the Chairperson of the Region of Hamilton-Wentworth will be elected at large. This is the first time that this has occurred in a regional government in Ontario.

However, direct election raises a number of concerns. Candidates running for the office of Regional Chairperson in Niagara must cover an area of 179,828 hectares with a population of approximately 370,000 people. This area covers five federal and six provincial constituencies. It is obviously a very large constituency. Very few cities in Canada where the mayors are elected at-large have populations larger than Niagara's.

However, the Niagara region differs from a city in several important respects. Unlike the situation in large urban cities, the media in this region is very fragmented. There is no television station located in the area. The radio market is fragmented with many people listening to Toronto, Hamilton and Buffalo stations. There is no predominant local newspaper covering the affairs of the entire region. Ironically,

only the Toronto and Hamilton newspapers are available to all residents of the area. Furthermore, it is well-understood that each of the local newspapers in this area adopts a fairly narrow geographic focus.

This fragmented media pattern has two consequences for at-large election of a Chairperson. Very few Regional politicians are well-known throughout the Region, and the fragmented nature of the media makes it expensive for any candidate to mount a campaign to make his or her name well-known.

This situation works most strongly against candidates from smaller municipalities who do not have the opportunity for free "advertising" which councillors from larger areas get through the ordinary media coverage of council activities. Unless a councillor from a smaller area can spend a great deal of money, he or she has little chance in a region-wide contest.

The level of expenditures necessary could prevent some good candidates from running. Some people have expressed concern that only political parties have the level of human and financial resources necessary to conduct this kind of campaign. Thus, this method of election could encourage political parties to become actively involved in the local arena--a possibility opposed by many people. Alternatively, only a wealthy person or someone who could obtain significant contributions from others could run for office. In the latter case, there would be a danger that campaign contributors could influence the Chairperson after his or her election.

It should be emphasized that a law limiting campaign spending is not a solution to this problem. For reasons mentioned above, such a law would simply work to the advantage of candidates from the larger cities.

In short, while the idea of electing a Chairperson by a region-wide popular ballot is an attractive idea, there are some particularities of the Niagara area which must be seriously considered before reaching a final decision.

Must the Chairperson Be a Member of Regional Council?

Currently, the Regional Council can select anyone to be Regional Chairperson. The person does not have to be a regional councillor or even a resident of the Region. The first Regional Chairperson was never elected to Regional Council, but was a very experienced and popular local politician. The second Chairperson was elected

from the ranks of Regional Council. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a Council selecting someone as Chairperson who is not currently a councillor or has not had significant regional experience.

Still, the provision remains in the legislation that this can be done. This provision rankles many people because it means that someone who has never been tested in the electoral scene and is only indirectly accountable to the general public can suddenly become Regional Chairperson. In practice, it is difficult to imagine this happening.

The option of requiring that the Regional Chairperson must chosen from the ranks of regional council should be considered seriously. While this system does not go as far as direct election, it would ensure that the Chairperson was accountable to some constituency. It is not unlike the parliamentary system in which a first minister is elected from only one riding, but holds the office of first minister because of some other electoral mechanism.

Should the Chairperson Have to Resign His or Her Seat?

The main argument for requiring a councillor elected Regional Chairperson to resign his or her seat is that a conflict of interest could exist between the person's role as the head of Regional Council and his or her role as a Councillor elected to look after the interests of a particular jurisdiction.

There are two ways of looking at this problem. On the one hand, the Chairperson's constituents might feel that he or she is too busy with other duties to look after their interests. On the other hand, the Chairperson's colleagues on council might feel that he or she might favour his or her area to ensure re-election.

This same dilemma is faced in federal and provincial governments where a first minister does not resign his or her seat upon becoming Prime Minster or premier. If these concerns can be worked out for politicians who govern nations and provinces, it seems surprising that they cause so much concern and agitation when suggested for regional government.

The favouritism concern will always exist. However, federal and provincial politicians soon learn that there are real dangers in spreading the patronage too thickly. There are even stronger safeguards against this sort of

thing in regional governments where the Chairperson does not have a vote except in the case of a tie.

A good Chairperson will be aware that the system works properly only if he or she retains the confidence of Council as a fair and even-handed leader. The Chairperson jeopardizes that position if he or she engages in patronage activities. While obvious favouritism might make it easier to get re-elected as a Regional Councillor, it would make it more difficult to be re-elected as Regional Chairperson.

On balance, it seems that serious consideration ought to be given to allowing a Chairperson to retain his or her seat on Council. If this is done, then the Chairperson must be allowed to vote in all cases, not just to break a tie. This is not a radical suggestion; mayors and wardens (heads of county councils) already have a right to vote in all circumstances.

Should Mayors be Eligible for Election as Chairperson?

Currently, the mayors of the area municipalities have the same right as anyone else to stand for election for Regional Chairperson. In the last election, several mayors put their names forward. The election of a mayor as Regional Chairperson would cause considerable dislocation, because a by-election would be necessary to replace him or her. This would be costly and would cause more difficulty than replacing a directly-elected regional councillor.

The necessity of a by-election would be removed if the Chairperson could serve without resigning his or her seat. It was argued above that a person could serve as both Regional Chairperson and councillor from a particular municipality without being in a serious conflict of interest situation.

However, serving as both Regional Chairperson and mayor is not a similar situation. A mayor is head of an area municipal council, and comes to Regional Council as the sole spokesperson for that municipality's council. Serving as the head of two councils is an impossible situation.

If the Commission recommends that the Regional Chairperson should <u>not</u> be required to resign his or her seat, then a logical point which flows from this is that mayors cannot also serve as Regional Chairperson.

Ensuring That Provisions Fit Together Properly Is Important

A complication in choosing from the alternatives outlined above is that it is not simply a matter of choosing the best solution in each isolated case. Some solutions fit together better than others. When a decision is made about one component of the system, other elements fall naturally into place. For example, the current legislation requires a Chairperson to resign his or her council seat and allows council to choose a non-elected person as Chairperson. The most likely use of this latter provision is the re-appointment of someone who has already served as Chairperson.

If a Chairperson had to be elected to a council seat, and then resign his or her seat to become Chairperson, this could create an awkward and potentially damaging situation. For example, Council selected the first Regional Chairperson to serve six terms in succession. If he had been forced to seek election those six times, he would have been forced to resign his seat six times, and six by-elections would have ensued. In addition, this would have created an awkward situation in that he would have contested his seat against someone who had been sitting in that seat for the past term of Council. Such a situation surely has the potential for heightening tension on Council.

On the one hand, one could suggest a continuation of the status quo with resignation required and an unelected person eligible to be Chairperson. Alternatively, one could suggest that the Chairperson must be selected from among elected councillors, but that the person selected not be required to resign his or her council seat. Mix and match does not work well.

Another example of the importance of goodness of fit has to do with the eligibility of mayors for the Regional Chairperson's position. If the system were changed so that the Chairperson could only be selected from among councillors and the current system of representation were retained, then mayors must remain eligible for election as Regional Chairperson, if every area municipality is to have opportunity for its representative to be elected as Regional Chairperson. This arises because there are three municipalities represented on Regional Council only by their mayors. Therefore, making mayors ineligible to be Regional Chairperson would amount to saying that the Chairperson could never come from these three municipalities--clearly an inappropriate situation. If the electoral system were changed so that all municipalities were

guaranteed at least two representatives, then this objection would disappear.

This goodness of fit issue is important because it complicates the choices considerably. It means that addressing the issues above is not simply a matter of choosing the desired solution in each isolated case. Rather, one must choose the best mix of alternatives. This might entail selecting one element of a solution which is second-best, only because it fits with another item which is highly desirable.

OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO THE CHAIRPERSON'S POSITION

The Sexist Nature of the Current Title of Chairman

All legislation dealing with the Region refers to the head of council as the Chairman. The trend in recent years has been to use titles which do not identify positions with particular sexes; for example, firefighter instead of fireman and flight attendant instead of stewardess. This might be an appropriate time to recognize this trend with regard to the head of regional council. Some might denounce this as tokenism or being nothing more than symbolic. However, symbolism is important in signalling and accepting changes in society's views on issues.

The title of the head of council should be changed to Chairperson.

The Lack of Clearly-Defined Duties for the Chairperson

The Regional Chairperson has only minimal responsibilities defined in legislation. Of course, his or her effective duties go far beyond this minimum. The problem is that these responsibilities are not defined clearly.

An advantage of this ambiguity is that it offers the incumbent a wide latitude in defining his or her role. A Chairperson must rely on political dexterity, full time presence, familiarity with staff, and access to information to discharge successfully the office's many and sometimes conflicting roles. Therefore, a wider latitude of discretion enables the Chairperson to perform the position's many duties in a fashion which is comfortable to him or her.

A problem with failing to define, in statute, the roles and responsibilities of the Chairperson is that it

confuses the public and poses potential problems in relationships between the Chairperson and those with whom he or she works most closely, particularly the heads of council committees and senior staff.

Some consideration should be given to defining the roles and responsibilities of the Chairperson either in provincial legislation or by a council by-law.

The Wording of the Chairperson's Oath of Office

The Chairperson is sworn into office by a judge and signs the "Declaration of Qualification." There are certain references in this document which seem outdated.

First, the "Declaration" stipulates that the elected chairperson must be a "British subject." In line with recent changes in municipal legislation and other higher-profile events, such as the patriation of the constitution, it might be appropriate to refer to the Chairperson as a Canadian citizen.

Second, the Declaration also specifies that the Chairperson must be "of the full age of twenty-one years." The rationale for including this age of eligibility appears outdated. Since the voting age in Ontario is eighteen, this should be amended to reflect the current voting requirements.

A P P E N D I X

SURVEY OF REGIONAL COUNCILLORS

In July 1988, the Commission conducted a survey of Regional Councillors to gather information on their attitudes on many issues confronting the Region. The questionnaire used was very similar to a questionnaire administered by the Archer Commission in 1976. Some new questions were added, but many of the questions asked were identical to the ones asked ten year ago. This provides an opportunity to analyse the attitudes of this council and to compare them to the attitudes of the earlier council to see how they have evolved over the years. In 1988, twenty-seven of thirty councillors responded. In 1976, twenty of twenty-nine councillors responded. While the answers to some questions vary between the two councils, the overall similarity of responses of the 1976 and 1988 councils is quite striking.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Survey of Niagara Regional Councillors

(July 1988)

Instructions

Listed below are statements about the structure and operation of the Regional Municipality. Please read each of them and then indicate at the right by circling the appropriate letters whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statement.

SD = Strongly Disagree

D = Disagree

A = Agree

SA = Strongly Agree

If you wish to add any comments, please feel free to do so either next to the question or on the back of the page.

The Commission plans to summarize the results of this questionnaire and produce information about overall responses. The responses of individual councillors are confidential and will not be revealed in any form. To be able to identify responses during the confidential interviews between councillors and staff of the Commission, it would be beneficial to have the names of respondents. However, do not feel that you must sign this if you are uncomfortable doing so.

WHERE TWO SETS OF FIGURES ARE PRESENTED, THE TOP ONE IS FOR 1988 AND THE BOTTOM ONE IS FROM 1976. WHERE THERE IS ONLY ONE SET OF FIGURES PRESENTED, THEY ARE FOR 1988. THE QUESTION WAS NOT ASKED IN 1976.

Statements	SD	D	A	SA
1. All things considered, the Regional Municipality has done a good job.	- 1	1 -	21 13	3 6

		SD	D	A	SA
2.	In particular, the Regional Municipality is doing a good job in the following areas:				
	roads and public works	-	3	20	4
	social services	-	1	14	12
	land use planning	3	7	12	3
	economic development	1	5	14	5
	public health services	1	1	17	6
3.	It is difficult for a Regional Councillor with a regular job to find enough time to do all the things he or she should as a Regional Councillor.	1 -	7 7	11 9	8 3
4.	It is the duty of Mayors, not other Regional Councillors, to keep area municipal councils informed about Regional affairs.	3 4	13 9	7 6	3 1
5.	I am satisfied with the number of representatives which my area municipality currently has on Regional Council.	4	3	16	4
6.	Some Regional Department Heads operate too independently and overall administrative coordination suffers.	2 -	13 16	8 3	3 -
7.	The Mayors of the area municipalities should continue to serve as members of Regional Council.	4	2	10	10
8.	The Regional Chairman should take a regular and active part in committee deliberations.	1 1	4 3	16 14	6 1
9.	Most Regional Councillors do less than they should to defend the Region and explain the advantages of Regional Government to the people.	- 1	6 3	13 11	8 4

		SD	D	A	SA
10.	Some Regional Councillors become too involved with administrative details and this interferes unnecessarily with efficient staff operations.	1 1	14 16	10 -	1 1
11.	Regional Councillors deserve to be paid more than they are paid at present.	6 2	3 3	13 11	4 4
12.	The Regional Chairman deserves to be paid more than he is paid at present.	5	13	6	1
13.	The Regional Chairman should be selected by a vote of the general public rather than by councillors.	16	5	2	4
14.	The present practice of having some Regional Councillors who do not sit on local councils is a good one and should be continued.	1 1	4 4	11 9	11 6
15.	Regional expenditures have been increasing too rapidly in the last few years.	2	8	14	3
16.	Regional Council is too large and should be reduced.	9 4	15 12	2 4	1
17.	The size of Regional Council can be increased slightly with no adverse consequences.	1	8	14	4
18.	Committee and Board assignments for Regional Councillors should be rotated on a regular basis.	1 3	8 7	12 6	4 2
19.	The standing committees of Regional Council tend to operate on their own and this results in a lack of coordination.	3 4	18 12	5 2	- 1
20.	Department Heads should meet frequently to discuss coordination and to make reports to Council on matters of a general nature.	- -	2 1	17 14	7 5

		SD	D	A	SA
21.	The Regional Chairman should provide leadership in the Regional Council by advocating new policies and programs and by trying to win support for them.	1 1	3 7	16 9	6 2
22.	Ways should be found to reduce the time a Regional Councillor must spend in committee and sub-committee meetings.	1 -	14 10	9 8	3 -
23.	Compared to other Regional Councillors, Mayors are more interested in promoting the interest of their own municipalities.	4 1	8 5	8 11	7 2
24.	The image of the Regional Municipality has been hurt by Regional Councillors who are tied to political parties and who attack the Region for political purposes.	3 2	15 7	6 6	3 5
25.	If Regional Councillors are not constantly on guard, senior staff tend to exercise too much influence on matters which should properly be decided by Councillors.	1 -	7 5	14 10	5 2
26.	In order to achieve better coordination of committee work, the Regional Council should have a Coordinating Committee or an Executive Policy Committee.	6 4	10 13	8 3	3 -
27.	The job of Regional Councillor should continue to be a part time one.	2 1	- 1	22 15	3 3
28.	Mayors give less time to Regional affairs than other Regional Councillors do.	5 3	6 9	12 7	3 -
29.	Regional Council and its committees should strive to set more policies so that more business can be handled directly by staff.	- -	15 5	7 13	5 1

		SD	D	A	SA
30.	It is not important for the Regional Chairman to be well known among the general public.	10 4	11 6	3 8	3 1
31.	The Regional Municipality has benefitted by appointing a Chief Administrative Officer.	2 2	2 10	11 5	10 3
	1976 Wording: The Regional Municipality could benefit by appointing a Chief Administrative Officer or Coordinator of Regional Services.				
32.	Regional property taxes have been increasing too rapidly in the last few years.	2	6	16	3
33.	Most Regional Councillors approach issues from a regional point of view.	2 -	4 7	19 13	1 -
34.	The Regional Municipality does a good job of communicating with the public.	12	9	5	-
35.	The current relationship between Council and the Regional Police Commission should not be changed.	8	8	8	2
36.	The relationship between Council and the various agencies, boards, and commissions should not be changed. (This question does not apply to the Police Commission which is mentioned in the question above.)	4	4	15	2

Questions

1. Please estimate the average number of hours per week you devote to the following activities:

_____ Regular occupation

_____ Regional Municipal affairs

_____ Area Municipal affairs

_____ Other political and community activities.

1988 Response:

Time devoted to regular occupation varied too much to be reported. For mayors and non-mayors the median times reported in each of the other categories is as follows:

	Mayors (8)	Non-Mayors (13)
Regional	7 hrs.	15 hrs.
Local	27 hrs.	2 hrs.
Other	2 hrs.	5 hrs.

1976 Response:

Reported on the same basis as 1988:

	Mayors (7)	Non-Mayors (10)
Regional	10 hrs.	15 hrs.
Local	35 hrs.	3 hrs.
Other	5 hrs.	4 hrs.

2. If you were to suggest ways to improve the operation of the Regional Council and Municipality, what would be your main proposals?

1988 Response:

Seventeen councillors responded to this question. The replies varied quite widely, but two themes came through clearly. First, in spite of what some in the area municipalities might think, Regional Councillors are quite sensitive to their concerns. Several councillors suggested that some responsibilities for certain services (usually, roads and planning) be turned over to the area municipalities.

The second theme was a concern about the public perception of the Region and a need for better communications. This was expressed in a number of ways such as the need for re-establishment of the public relations committee or a more professional regional communications policy.

Smaller numbers of people also referred to direct election of the regional chairperson and the need for an executive committee of council.

1976 Response:

Although there were a few specific suggestions made, many Councillors left this question blank and there was little agreement among those who made suggestions. Perhaps the most common (but still infrequent) suggestion was to appoint a CAO.

3. Of the decisions made by the Region during the last few years, which two have given you the greatest personal satisfaction?

1988 Response:

Seventeen councillors responded to this question. There were two clearly dominant responses. One was in the area of services to senior citizens. Some respondents emphasized construction of new homes for seniors, and others discussed the variety of programs available.

The second dominant theme was hard services. A number of councillors referred in general to water and sewage treatment facilities or to specific projects.

Other responses varied quite widely. Several replies referred to children's services, construction of the regional headquarters, group homes policies, 911, the Niagara Region Development Corporation, and the review of policing.

1976 Response:

Of the twenty Councillors who completed the questionnaire, eight left this question blank or indicated they did not know what to say. Of these eight, six were mayors!

Of the twelve answering, only three mentioned specific local decisions--all in the public works field. Otherwise, Councillors identified with a wide variety of decisions of a Regional nature. The favorite decisions were:

Adoption of uniform sewer and water rates (8)
Preparation of Policy Plan (3)

3 1761 11547182 3